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So Nissan has decided to remain in the UK; how soon and how much 
new investment will take place here remains to be seen; but Nissan 
keeping its existing assets going is good news, for now.  How far its 
operations remain oriented to Europe or become more UK-focused 
will be interesting to observe.  In truth, with even the thin UK-EU deal 
which was agreed at the end of 2020, Nissan was always much more 
likely to stay than go.  Nissan made clear that without the deal, the 
plant would have closed; even so, this is not winning the Premier 
League – it is staying in it, with difficulty, rather like Burnley seems to 
do each year. 
So while Nissan Sunderland might be akin to Burnley (in Premier 
League survival terms!), what of Vauxhall Ellesmere Port? Will it be 
Burnley Mark 2 (a Crystal Palace if you will) or will it be Nottingham 
Forest, finally departing the league and seemingly never to return? 
One way or another, the future of Vauxhall Ellesmere Port will soon 
be decided.  PSA is weighing up whether to invest there to make new 
models, either the new Astra (which will definitely be made in 
Germany irrespective of the Ellesmere Port decision) or possibly other 
models based on PSA platforms. Speaking on the day after the 
merger of PSA and FCA was confirmed and the new company, 
Stellantis, saw its shares launched on the stock market, CEO Carlos 
Tavares said the outcome will be known within a few weeks.  So 
perhaps by the end of February one of the questions I am most 
frequently by journalists will be answered officially and the constant 
speculation can end. 
Outside the EU, as is now all too apparent in a variety of industries, 
even with a so-called zero tariff, zero quota trade deal, trade is far 
from free and frictionless.  Delays, customs checks, VAT payments, 
administrative charges – and yes, import duty (tariffs in other words) – 
are affecting companies and individuals alike.  Although the 
automotive industry is well used to form filling and customs 
compliance, none of the additional tasks which UK vehicle operations 
have to undertake makes the case for PSA investing in Ellesmere 
Port any easier.  
Of course, PSA may decide that leaving the UK and closing Ellesmere 
Port will risk too much damage to the Vauxhall name and a loss of 
brand equity.  Perhaps, but this is a very difficult thing to measure 
accurately.  More interestingly, Tavares emphasised in his briefing to 
journalists that a key factor in PSA’s decision will be the attitude of the 
UK government; he specifically raised the question of whether the 
government can effectively convince PSA that it wants to retain a 
vehicle manufacturing sector in the UK.   The Nissan decision helps, 
but what PSA will want remains to be seen. 
And this is where understanding a little bit of history comes in 
handy.  In 1959, and through the early 1960s, a central pillar the 
Conservative government’s economic strategy was the Distribution of 
Industry policy.  There was a widespread feeling at the time that 
economic activity was overly concentrated in London, the south-east 
and Birmingham. Some may say that not much has changed since 
then, certainly with regard to the concentration of the economy in the 
London area. 
With the north-south economic divide and rising unemployment 
increasing north of the Midlands especially, the government embarked 
on what might today be called a process of levelling up.  Companies 
were prevented from expanding their manufacturing activities in 
London and the south-east unless they made comparable 
investments in designated areas outside London, specifically in the 
north-west, the north-east, Scotland and Wales. 
The policy led directly to three all-new car plants: Vauxhall at 
Ellesmere Port, and others at Halewood (by Ford, but now part of 
Jaguar Land Rover) and at Linwood in Scotland (by Rootes and long 
since closed); in addition, BMC built a truck plant in Edinburgh and 
expanded its radiator and pressings factory in Swansea (an operation 
which survives today, owned by KKR, a hedge fund which bought 
Calsonic of Japan).  
Also on Merseyside, Standard-Triumph expanded its existing factory. 
The new and expanded factories led to additional capacity for making 
600,000 vehicles a year; and in exchange for opening new factories 
on Merseyside, both Ford and Vauxhall were granted permission to 
expand in their operations in Basildon & Dagenham and Luton & 
Dunstable respectively.  Interestingly, government papers also reveal 
that the first factory approval under the Distribution of Industry policy 
was bizarrely, and contrary to the “levelling up” aims of the time, 
granted to Chrysler, for a factory in Kew, west London, using mainly 
French sourced components.  If only that had been built … 
The Ellesmere Port site itself was acquired by Vauxhall in 1961, 
construction beginning in 1962 and by early 1963 vehicle production 
was under way.  Some parts were made in Ellesmere Port for the 
Vauxhall plant in Luton, while Luton supplied parts to Ellesmere Port. 
An interlinked supply chain was born; by 1964 there were 24 
truckloads a day between the two plants, with this total later rising to 
48 per day.  
Some years later, in 1986, a report by the DTI (the forerunner of 
BEIS) claimed that across all industries, over 600,000 jobs were 
created in development areas through the Distribution of Industry 
policy. However, around 150,000  of these had been lost by 1981, 
meaning a net direct job creation total of 450,000 jobs; in addition, 
beyond the jobs directly generated by the Distribution of Industry 
policy, a further 180,000 jobs in related sectors, ie the supply chain 
and supporting sectors, had also been created.  The government 
report regarded this as a real success.  On the surface this appears to 
be true, although there was an immense variety in the cost of each job 
created, ranging from £10,000 per job in clothing to £367,000 per job 
in metal manufacturing (these and other figures are stated at 1982 
prices). 
The cost of this policy for the automotive industry amounted to £543m 
between 1966 and 1976 alone, with 38,000 jobs created, at just over 
£14,000 each.  By comparison with some sectors, the automotive 
industry appears to have been remarkably good value for 
money.  The actual number of jobs created was actually greater than 
this as the Ellesmere Port and Halewood factories were fully 
operational by 1966; by the mid-1970s, the two factories alone were 
employing c25,000.  Of course, they employ far fewer now (Halewood 
c3,500-4,000 and Ellesmere Port just c1,100) as the plants have 
automated, modernised and moved in-house component production 
out to suppliers.  Back in the 1960s, car companies made as much as 
70% or more of their components in-house, a far cry from industry’s 
practice today. 
Fast forward to 2021 and, one way or another, despite the multiple 
problem of General Motors (Vauxhall’s owners for many years) in 
Europe, Ellesmere Port (now owned by PSA of France) is still there, 
just about.  But only 30,000 vehicles came off the assembly line in 
2020; this is well below the 120,000 notional capacity and is a fraction 
of the peak volume of 151,000 made in 1965.  The plant has been 
threatened with closure on a number of occasions, but a combination 
of union agreement to reduce costs, astute management, and UK 
government support have kept the plant going (Vince Cable when 
Trade and Industry secretary even flew to New York to meet the 
bankers running GM at the time to make the case for keeping the 
factory open, with evident success).  
But now, the factory’s future is very much at a crossroads.  It has 
been a core part of the industrial landscape and economic geography 
of the area for almost 60 years; it is proof that government 
intervention and industrial policy – even when prosecuted by a 
Conservative government – can have a long-term and positive impact. 
Whether it survives will now depend, in part at least, on whether the 
current Conservative government can persuade the factory’s French 
owners that it values manufacturing industry and foreign investment. 
And to return to the football analogy; will Ellesmere Port be Crystal 
Palace, and live to fight another model cycle or two, or be Nottingham 
Forest and disappear (from the Premier League at least)? 
 
